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WHITE GERRYMANDERING OF BLACK
VOTERS: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR
EVERETT
CH4NDLER DAVIDSON*
Professor Robinson Everett's paper focuses on the 1990s'
gerrymandering of districts in North Carolina which enabled the state's
black voters to elect black U.S. Representatives for the first time in the
twentieth century. In Shaw v. Reno, Everett persuaded the U.S.
Supreme Court that these racial gerrymanders violated the Equal
Protection Clause. In my response, I claim that white legislators' racial
gerrymandering, to the disadvantage of black voters, has been widely
used in Southern states from the First Reconstruction well into the
Second Reconstruction. This is the main reason so few blacks won
elective office until the Voting Rights Act, and 1970s and 1980s federal
case law provided a remedy for black descriptive under-representation.
The Act, I argue, is still needed to overcome the effects of white
gerrymandering, although future efforts to increase black descriptive
representation may, in some instances, conflict with the goal of
maximizing black substantive representation.
Professor Robinson Everett's paper' combines a description of
the legal background of Shaw v. Reno2 and, most recently, Hunt v.
Cromartie' with his reminiscences as a plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel.
A reader unaware of the history of racial gerrymandering in America
might infer from Everett's paper that the practice came into existence
in 1992, when two oddly shaped majority-black districts drawn by the
North Carolina General Assembly offended the state's white voters
and prompted them to file suit against the redistricting plan. While
Everett surely did not intend to encourage such an inference, the
* Tsanoff Professor of Public Affairs, Professor, Departments of Sociology and
Political Science, Rice University. B.A., University of Texas; Ph.D., Princeton University.
The author would like to thank the following people for their comments on earlier drafts
of this paper: Bernard Grofman, J. Gerald Hebert, Sam Hirsch, Samuel Issacharoff,
Pamela Karlan, Fred McBride, Laughlin McDonald, and David Richards.
1. Robinson 0. Everett, Redistricting in North Carolina-A Personal Perspective, 79
N.C. L. REv. 1301 (2001).
2. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
3. 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
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historical record is so decisively at odds with it that an explicit
statement of that fact is warranted. Briefly put, whites have
ruthlessly, systematically, and pretty much without hindrance
gerrymandered African-American voters in this country from
Reconstruction to the modern era.4
In the spirit of Everett's paper, I shall indulge in some
reminiscences of my own as a prelude to sketching the outlines of
racial gerrymandering over the centuries. I grew up as the civil rights
revolution unfolded, graduating from high school in 1954, the year the
Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education.5 I remember
the division created in the Baptist church I attended as a college
freshman when the pastor, Lory Hildreth, courageously asked the
white congregation to support a public statement welcoming people
of all races into our midst. The unsuccessful opposition was led by a
University of Texas law student who, while a Republican appellate
judge in Houston years later, was instrumental in organizing
fundamentalists to take control of the Southern Baptist Convention
and to politicize their religious agenda.6
In 1962, while I was writing for The Texas Observer in Austin,
Willie Morris, the editor, excitedly discussed with me the implications
for black representation of Baker v. Carr' after the decision was
announced. I was in graduate school when the Civil Rights Act of
19648 and the Voting Rights Act of 19659 were passed and when
presidential candidate Barry Goldwater embarked on the Republican
"Southern strategy"--using race as a wedge issue to lure southern
whites angered by federal anti-discrimination laws away from the
Democratic Party and into the GOP."°
As a young researcher studying African-American politics in
Houston a few years later, I interviewed many remarkable people in
the city's black community. One was a sprightly dentist in the
predominantly black Fifth Ward, Dr. Lonnie Smith, the named
plaintiff in Smith v. Allwright," the lawsuit argued by Thurgood
4. J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS
AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 25-31 (1999).
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6. CHANDLER DAVIDSON, RACE AND CLASS IN TEXAs POLITICS 215 (1990).
7. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
8. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447
and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
9. Pub. L. No. 89-110,79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973 (1994)).
10. DAVIDSON, supra note 6, at 226-34.
11. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
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Marshall which led the Supreme Court in 1944 to declare the white
primary unconstitutional. 2 Another was George Nelson, known
locally as "Mr. NAACP," a black barber whose shop was located on a
spot now occupied by the Alley Theater, a downtown landmark.
Nelson had helped raise money for the plaintiffs in Smith and in its
wake helped organize black voter registration drives. He kept a
scrapbook on the Houston civil rights movement for his customers to
leaf through while waiting their turn in the barber's chair.13 Another
was Christia Adair, a precinct judge and NAACP official in the city's
Third Ward whose activities on behalf of black rights sometimes led
to bomb threats against her.14 Long before then, in the 1910s, Adair
had marched as a suffragette for the women's vote. Yet, as a black
woman, she could not cast a ballot in the Democratic primary until
the Smith decision.'
5
I interviewed Barbara Jordan in her office on Lyons Avenue in
1966, the year she became the first black candidate to win a Texas
senate seat since 1881.16 I met Curtis Graves, one of the two black
state representatives elected the same year who in 1969 would
challenge the incumbent mayor of Houston in his bid for re-election. 7
In 1972, my book on racial politics in the South was published,
and I was asked to testify as an expert witness in a challenge to an at-
large election scheme in Houston-a city that had been virtually
without black representation in city government since
Reconstruction. As an expert on racial politics, I later testified in a
number of lawsuits challenging minority vote dilution. In the years
that followed, the outlines of the South's racial politics became
clearer to me, and I would like to sketch them now, drawing in part
on historical research I conducted for Texas' unsuccessful defense of
its 1990s redistricting plan in Bush v. Vera.18 It should be noted that
Texas, like North Carolina, despite its grim history of slavery and of
caste oppression, has been among the more racially progressive states
of the former Confederacy'
9
12. Id. at 666.
13. Interview with George Nelson by Chandler Davidson, 1966.
14. Nancy Baker Jones, Christia V. Daniels Adair, in 1 THE NEW HANDBOOK OF
TEXAS 21 (1996) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
15. Interview with Christia Adair by Chandler Davidson, 1966.
16. ALWYN BARR, BLACK TEXANS: A HISTORY OF NEGROES IN TEXAS, 1528-1970,
at 179 (1973).
17. TEX. OBSERVER, May, 27, 1966, at 6 (noting that Graves was one of two black
state representatives elected in 1966); TEX. OBSERVER, Nov. 21, 1969, at 1 (reporting
Graves' challenge to the mayor of Houston).
18. 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
19. V.O. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 206,254 (1949).
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Gerrymandering in Texas began during Reconstruction, only a
few years after blacks were enfranchised.2 Drawn by whites and
targeted at heavily black counties in East Texas, racial gerrymanders
sharply reduced African-American representation in legislative and
judicial bodies.2' In 1876, 117 years before Shaw, an Austin
newspaper said that districts in the black-belt counties "were
'Gerrymandered,' the purpose being, in these elections, and properly
enough, to disfranchise the blacks by indirection."'  As the twentieth
century began, the state's blacks were indeed disfranchised, not
simply by the indirection of gerrymanders, but directly through
murderous violence, the poll tax, and the white primary.23 A similar
story can be told of North Carolina as well.24
With the abolition of the white primary in 1944, Texas blacks
again began voting. But almost no African Americans were elected
to office over the next two decades. On the eve of passage of the
Voting Rights Act in 1965, there were estimated to be less than seven
black elected officeholders above the level of voting-precinct official
in any of the hundreds of political jurisdictions in Texas. This was in
a state with over one million blacks-the largest number in any
Southern state-at a time when blacks were going to the polls in
growing numbers and voting with increasing sophistication.
Additionally, Texas had many large concentrations of black voters,
from which several well-qualified black candidates had run for office.
Yet only a minuscule number had won election by 1965.
Why? The answer is simple. The majority of whites were not
20. LAWRENCE D. RICE, THE NEGRO IN TEXAS: 1874-1900, at 132 (1971).
21. J. MASON BREWER, NEGRO LEGISLATORS OF TEXAS AND THEIR
DESCENDANTS: A HISTORY OF THE NEGRO IN TEXAS POLITICS FROM
RECONSTRUCTION TO DISENFRANCHISEMENT 41-42, 69 (1935); BARR, supra note 16, at
70-71.
22. RICE, supra note 20, at 26. By describing gerrymandering as disfranchising blacks
"by indirection," this Reconstruction-era writer captured the essence of race-based
redistricting targeted at a black minority population under conditions of extreme racial
polarization: It "disfranchises" not directly-by preventing blacks from voting-but
indirectly, by preventing blacks from electing fellow blacks to legislatures where almost all
the whites are unsympathetic to black interests. Under these circumstances,
gerrymandering nullifies the influence of blacks' ballots almost as surely as vote denial.
23. Chandler Davidson, African Americans in Politics, in HANDBOOK, supra note 14,
at 53.
24. KOUSSER, supra note 4, at 26-27; William R. Keech & Michael P. Sistrom, North
Carolina, in QUIET REvOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT, 1965-1990, at 155-57 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994)
[hereinafter QUIET REVOLUTIoN].
25. Robert Brischetto et al., Texas, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 24, at 233,270.
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predisposed to vote for black candidates. 2 6 This was not a matter of
white partisan preferences, for most of the contests involving black
candidates occurred either in the Democratic primaries or in
nonpartisan local contests.27 In either case, election districts with
black majorities were extremely rare. The white bloc vote thus
trumped the black one when black candidates ran for office. Re-
enfranchised African Americans were once again, to use the apt
words of the journalist in 1876, "disfranchised by indirection."'
Perhaps the most vivid demonstration of racial gerrymandering's
effects in Texas during this period was Barbara Jordan's efforts to win
election to the state House of Representatives from a majority-white
multi-member Houston district in 1962 and 1964. At the time, blacks
constituted almost twenty percent of the district.2 9 Jordan was a
formidable campaigner-eloquent, smart, personable, and hard-
working. As an undergraduate during the Jim Crow era at Texas
Southern University,3 0 she had been a star debater.3' By 1962, she
had earned a law degree from Boston University.
32
After returning to Houston, Jordan worked energetically for the
Democratic Party and campaigned for its nomination to a state House
seat in both 1962 and 1964.33 She lost both primary races to whites-
the first, for an open seat; the second, against a weak incumbent-by
over twenty points in racially polarized elections 4 Despite strong
support in black precincts, she was overwhelmed by the white bloc
vote.35
In 1966, Jordan overcame this obstacle and won election to the
26. Id. at 244.
27. CLIFrON MCCLEsKEY, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF TEXAS 43 (2d ed.
1966) (reporting that in state and county elections, winning in the Democratic primaries in
most cases was tantamount to election); id. at 292 (noting that cities of all sizes in Texas
used the nonpartisan ballot).
28. RICE, supra note 20, at 26; Brischetto et al., supra note 25, at 243.
29. Davidson, supra note 23.
30. Texas Southern University began as a school specifically created for blacks in a
futile attempt to prevent the integration of the University of Texas Law School. See
Marguerite L. Butler, The History of Texas Southern University, Thurgood Marshall
School of Law: "The House that Sweatt Built," 23 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 45,45 (1997).
31. As a member of the TSU debate team, Jordan teamed with Otis King, who would
later become Houston's first black city attorney, to tie the Harvard debate team when it
came to town. See BARBARA JORDAN & SHELBY HEARON, BARBARA JORDAN: A
SELF-PORTRAIT 82 (1979); Todd Ackerman, Barbara Jordan, 1936-1996; TSU
Remembers Famous Alumna; Oratory Skills Helped Stake Debate Team's Reputation,
HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 18, 1996, at A13.
32. JORDAN & HEARON, supra note 31, at 98.
33. See id at 110-17.
34. See id. at 112-17.
35. See id. at 115-17.
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Texas State Senate after defeating a white incumbent.36 This was not
simply the result of her persistence, however. Thanks to redistricting
following Reynolds v. Sims 37 and guided by the mandates of Kilgarlin
v. Martin,31 one Texas senatorial district was created with a combined
black and Hispanic population of about fifty percent.3 9
Barbara Jordan's experiences reflected the larger truth: Given
widespread racial gerrymandering and white bloc voting, blacks and
Hispanics had little chance of winning office in Texas. This was true
in the other Southern states as well-and certainly in North
Carolina.4" The drawing of majority-white districts, combined with
the tendency of whites to bloc vote for white candidates, prevented
blacks from electing candidates of their choice. After the 1970s
redistricting, a labor and civil rights lawyer, David Richards, filed
suits on behalf of black and Hispanic clients in federal district court
challenging a number of racially gerrymandered multi-member
districts. One, Graves v. Barnes,41  was brought by the
aforementioned black state representative, Curtis Graves. Richards
argued that the districts diluted minority votes, and in doing so
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. In
1973, the Supreme Court agreed with this argument and struck down
Texas's legislative redistricting plan.42
Briefly put, a history of racial gerrymandering drawn by whites
against blacks beginning during the First Reconstruction and
continuing into the 1980s43 was a grim prelude to Shaw. Then, in the
latter half of the Second Reconstruction, White provided blacks with
some protection against dilution of their votes." Further, in 1982
Congress amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act-a feature
applying to the entire nation-forbidding political processes having
either the purpose or effect of preventing minorities of race or color
from electing representatives of their choice, and the U.S. Supreme
Court four years later found the amendment to be constitutional in
Thornburg v. Gingles 5  These developments raised the hopeful
36. See id. at 130,134.
37. 377 U.S. 577 (1964).
38. 252 F. Supp. 404,410 (S.D. Tex. 1966) (invalidating Texas's apportionment statute
mandating a limit of one state senator per county).
39. Brischetto et al., supra note 25, at 244.
40. See Keech & Sistrom, supra note 24, at 162-63.
41. 343 F. Supp. 704 (1972).
42. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973).
43. KOUSSER, supra note 4,25-31.
44. 412 U.S. at 765.
45. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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possibility that for the first time in American history, a decennial
redistricting would occur in which not only equal protection for
blacks under the one-person, one-vote principle would be ensured,
but also protection from other race-based gerrymandering schemes
designed by whites to "disfranchise by indirection."
Even before the 1990s redistricting, the combined effects of
White, the Voting Rights Act, and Gingles were remarkable. My
colleagues and I discovered a sharp increase in black office-holding in
the South between 1965 and 1990V4 The focus of our study, the total
number of black state legislators and U.S. representatives in the eight
Southern states, increased from two in 1964 to 160 in 1990.47 In
Texas, the number of black elected officials increased from less than
seven to 312. As late as 1966, there were no blacks in either the 120-
member North Carolina House of Representatives or 50-member
Senate 9 By 1990 there were thirteen and five, respectively.50 Our
research found that litigation under White, Gingles, and sections 2 and
5 of the Voting Rights Act exerted a strong direct influence on the
ability of black voters to overcome the effects of widespread white
racial gerrymandering-a finding that applied to the seven other
states in our study as well, including North Carolina.
Black office-holding improved throughout the region during the
past decade. Indeed, some of the states whose percentage of black
officeholders comes closest to equaling the black percentage in the
population are Southern states with the worst history of racial
oppression. For example, in 1999 23.9% of Alabama's voting-age
population was black, as was 16.5% of its elected officials. The
equivalent figures for Mississippi were 33.3% and 17.9%; for
Louisiana, 29.6% and 14.1%; for South Carolina, 27.8% and 13.7%;
and for Virginia, 19.0% and 8.1%. 51
Of particular interest is the presence today of African-American
U.S. Representatives in the eleven-state South,52 which is about 19%
46. See Bernard Grofian & Chandler Davidson, The Effect of Municipal Election
Structure on Black Representation in Eight Southern States, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra
note 24, at 319-21.
47. Davidson & Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the Second Reconstruction, in
QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 24, at 381.
48. Brischetto et al., supra note 25, at 270.
49. See Keech & Sistrom, supra note 24, at 190.
50. See id.
51. DAVID A. BosITIs, BLACK ELECTED OFFICIALs: A STATISTICAL SUMMARY,
1999, at 12 (2000).
52. Included in this definition of the South are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia-
those states defined by KEY, supra note 19, at 6-7, as constituting the South.
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black.53 While blacks are still underrepresented in nine of those
states, the 1990s redistricting brought significant gains, as
demonstrated in table 1. The remaining underrepresentation,
moreover, is not solely the result of racial gerrymandering by whites.
Various other factors in the district-based, winner-take-all election
system-particularly small geographic concentrations of blacks and
small numbers of seats in various jurisdictions-contribute to the
disproportionately small number of black elected officials. 4
Table 1: Black United States Representatives
in the Eleven-State South, Year 2000
State Population* Representatives Proportional
Total Black Total Black Black Representation
# % # # % %
Alabama 4,352 25.2 7 1** 14.3 57
Arkansas 2,538 15.9 4 0 0.0 00
Florida 14,916 13.6 23 3** 13.0 96
Georgia 7,642 26.9 11 3 27.3 101
Louisiana 4,369 30.8 7 1 14.3 46
Mississippi 2,752 35.6 5 1 20.0 56
N.C. 7,546 22.0 12 2** 16.7 76
S.C. 3,836 29.8 6 1** 16.7 56
Tenn. 5,431 15.9 9 1 11.1 70
Texas 19,760 11.9 30 2 6.7 56
Virginia 6,791 18.8 11 1** 9.1 48
Total 79,933 19.0 125 16*** 12.8 67
* Estimated 1998 population in thousands.
** In these states, no blacks were elected to Congress between the Reconstruction era and the 1990s round of
redistricting.
*** None of these black representatives was initially elected to Congress from a majority-white district, although a
few have been re-elected from districts that became majority-white in the wake of the Shaw litigation.
Source: Michael Barone & Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics (2000).
In spite of the gains, the continued tendency of many whites to
bloc vote for white candidates makes the Voting Rights Act a
53. Calculated from black population estimates in the eleven states in MICHAEL
BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2000 (1999).
54. DAVID BOSITIS, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION: THE CREATION OF
MAJORITY-MINORITY DISTRICTS AND THE EVOLVING PARTY SYSTEM IN THE SOUTH 6-
7 (1995); Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley, Black Representation: Making Sense of
Electoral Geography At Different Levels of Government, XIV LEGIS. STUD. Q. 2 (1989).
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necessary tool for ensuring fair minority representation. Even before
Shaw was decided by the Supreme Court, however, it was obvious to
many observers that solutions to minority vote discrimination
afforded by the Act raise new problems.
One of the most controversial issues in the civil rights community
is whether a significant trade-off sometimes exists between the
number of black elected office-holders and the size of the Democratic
margin in legislative bodies. Because blacks are solidly Democratic55
and because there are sharp differences between Democrats of
whatever color and Republicans on policy issues concerning race,
56
such a trade-off could present an agonizing dilemma-the choice
between black office-holders and the enactment of black-preferred
policy. The dilemma would be all the more exquisite if the creation
of black seats cost Democrats actual control of a legislative chamber
at the state or national level. This choice is usually referred to as that
between "descriptive" and "substantive" representation. After
having waged a long and difficult struggle to achieve a notable black
presence in legislative bodies, blacks could, depending on the
circumstances, face the prospect of foregoing further gains in
descriptive representation-or even ceding some of the gains already
made-in order to achieve substantive representation.
The likelihood and extent of such trade-offs would depend on
the particular context, including the demographic and political facts in
different locales. Richard Pildes has laid out the major issues to be
resolved in clarifying the question.57 Several scholars, including some
attending this conference, have since addressed them, with varying
results, generally suggesting that at the very least trade-offs exist in
some circumstances. 8
55. Edward T. Kantowicz, Voting and Parties, in THE POLITICS OF ETHNicrrY 63
(Michael Waltzer et al. eds., 1982).
56. DAVID LUBLIN, PARADOX OFREPRESENTATION 67-69 (1997).
57. Richard H. Pildes, The Politics of Race, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1388-89 (1994).
58. Among the burgeoning literature on this subject, see, e.g., LUBLIN, supra note 56,
98-119; CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERESTS: THE REPRESENTATION
OF AFRICAN AMERICANS IN CONGRESS 205-06 (1993) (arguing that creating black
districts likely drains black voters from other districts, thereby electing blacks but diluting
Democratic power); Kimball Brace et al., Does Redistricting Aimed to Help Blacks
Necessarily Help Republicans?, 49 J. POL. 169, 169-85 (1987) (exploring why plans that
advantage black representation also advantage Republicans); David Epstein & Sharyn
O'Halloran, Measuring the Electoral & Political Impact of Majority-Minority Voting
Districts, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 367,367-95 (1999); Kevin Hill, Does the Creation of Majority
Black Districts Aid Republicans? An Analysis of the 1992 Congressional Elections in Eight
Southern States, 57 J. POL. 384, 399 (1995); David Lublin & D. Stephen Voss, Racial
Redistricting and Realignment in Southern State Legislatures, 44 AM. J. POL. Sci. 792, 793
(2000) (concluding that racial redistricting harmed the black voters' party, although the
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This accords with the views of various Republican redistricting
strategists who, since the 1980s, have encouraged blacks and other
minorities covered by the Voting Rights Act to maximize the number
of minority seats at the expense of the Democratic margin.59 Indeed,
Rep. Thomas M. Davis III of Virginia, chair of the National
Republican Congressional Committee, stated in early 2001 that
Republicans were preparing lawsuits against Democratic efforts to
"unpack" majority-minority districts, labeling such efforts as
retrogressions in minority voting strength prohibited by Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act.6° The irony of this strategy, of course, is that
the party which since the 1960s has made race a wedge issue in the
South in order to convert white Democrats to the G.O.P. is at the
forefront of a movement to protect safe minority seats. For these
"Southern strategists," the trade-off between black seats and
Democratic seats in many venues is seen as an obvious reality. 61
In conclusion, the struggle for African-American political
representation has been long and hard. Black disfranchisement has
been the primary weapon of white racism since slavery times, and in
the years when southern blacks could vote-during Reconstruction
and again during the Second Reconstruction a century later-the use
of the gerrymander has been a secondary, albeit effective, weapon.
Since the 1960s, the Voting Rights Act and voting rights case law
invoking the Fourteenth Amendment gradually have limited the
extent of white gerrymandering. However, Shaw v. Reno, the
handiwork of Professor Everett, has placed limits on the extent to
white-voter shift to the Republican Party was the main force driving the increasing
strength of the Republican Party). In an oblique way, Bernard Grofman, Lisa Handley,
and David Lublin's paper at this conference, Drawing Effective Minority Districts, also
addresses the trade-off issue by arguing that districts without a supermajority of black
voters and, in some cases, districts containing even less than a mere majority of black
voters may have a fair chance to elect black officials in spite of low white crossover voting.
79 N.C. L. REV. 1383 (2001).
59. Michael Kelly, Segregation Anxiety, NEW YORKER, Nov. 20, 1995, at 43-48.
60. Thomas B. Edsall, Parties Play Voting Rights Role Reversal, WASH. POST, Feb. 25,
2001, at A4.
61. However, the first major redistricting case following the 2000 census offers some
hope to both minority voters and Democrats that the goal of increased minority office-
holding need not conflict with an increase in the Democratic legislative margin, even in
situations where such conflict might appear likely. A federal court in New Jersey found
that a proposed plan favored by Democratic officials and black leaders, in which existing
black-majority districts were divested of some black voters, did not violate either the U.S.
Constitution or the Voting Rights Act because there were sufficient white cross-over
voters remaining to enable the election of black candidates in those districts. See Page v.
Bartels, F. Supp. 2d, No. Civ. A. 01-1733, 2001 WL 505187 (D.N.J. May 7, 2001) (three-
judge court) (per curiam). But Republican officials have appealed the case to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
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which blacks can remedy the effects of white gerrymandering with
gerrymandering of their own. In addition, the perverse effects of at
least some of the "affirmative" gerrymanders the Shaw jurisprudence
still allows present blacks with yet one more challenge in their
continuing quest for full and fair representation.
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